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I. INTRODUCTION
T HE idea that lawsuit plaintiffs could obtain financing that would en-
able them to pursue their cases, or pursue them more vigorously, be-
gan to take hold in the United States more than fifteen years ago.1 There
were several legal impediments to such arrangements, but the ubiquity of
the internet made it easy for litigants to find willing lenders and litigation
funders to find customers.2 When the industry of litigation financing
* Cypres Family Distinguished Professor of Legal Studies in Business, Hofstra
University. The preparation of this article was supported by a research grant from
the Frank G. Zarb School of Business at Hofstra University.
1. See, e.g., Susan Lorde Martin, Syndicated Lawsuits: Illegal Champerty or New
Business Opportunity?, 30 AM. Bus. L.J. 485, 498 (1992) (citing Killian v. Millard, 279
Cal. Rptr. 877 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991)) [hereinafter "Syndicated Lawsuits"]; Intex
Plastic Sales Co. v. Hall, 20 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1367 (N.D. Cal. 1991)).
2. See Susan Lorde Martin, Financing Litigation On-Line: Usury and Other Obsta-
cles, 1 DEPAUL Bus. & COM. L.J. 85, 99-100 (2002) (listing on-line litigation financ-
ing firms).
(83)
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started, the litigation generally involved a business relationship. 3 Today,
although there are many situations where businesses large and small will
seek partners to undertake some of the expenses involved in pursuing liti-
gation in exchange for some of the proceeds of the lawsuit,4 the litigation
financing industry is most often recognized in the popular, professional
and academic presses because of its relationships with poor individual
plaintiffs. 5
The high fees of the funders, when the plaintiffs won their cases, has
led commentators and some courts to focus on the ill treatment of the
plaintiffs by the funders instead of by the defendants, the cause of the
plaintiffs' injuries in the first place. This view is encouraged by large cor-
porations and their insurers as they pursue their general mission of "tort
reform." 6 Although some funders have probably charged more than the
risk they were undertaking required, emphasizing that aspect of the indus-
try encourages onlookers to ignore the more important justice issue: how
can poor plaintiffs collect what's owed them by wealthy defendants who
wrongfully injured them? 7
Now that litigation funding is becoming a better known, mainstream
activity, its regulation should be decided by practical realities rather than
enforcement of ancient legal doctrines or shock at new financial services.
It is merely one of a variety of subprime financial arrangements, such as
home mortgages, payday loans, car-title loans and rent-to-own transac-
3. See, e.g., Killian, 279 Cal. Rptr. 877; Intex, 20 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1367.
4. It is difficult to document these arrangements because they are generally
private and not disclosed. Nevertheless, it is fairly well known that many large
lawsuits, such as the vitamins anti-trust suit, the asbestos cases and the Vioxx cases,
have been supported by litigation financing companies which are funded by banks,
private equity and hedge funds. See, e.g., Alison Frankel, Helping Underfunded Plain-
tiffs Lawyers-at a Price, Am. LAw., Feb. 13, 2006, available at http://www.law.com/
jsp/law/LawArticleFriendly.jsp?id=l 139565913200.
5. See, e.g., Douglas R. Richmond, Other People's Money: The Ethics of Litigation
Funding, 56 MERCER L. REv. 649, 649-50 (2005); George Steven Swan, The Economics
of Usury and the Litigation Funding Industry: Rancman v. Interim Settlement Funding
Corp., 28 OKLA. CrrY U. L. REv. 753, 758 (2003); Lauren J. Grous, Note, Causes of
Action for Sale: The New Trend of Legal Gambling, 61 U. MtAMI L. REv. 203, 204
(2006); Mariel Rodak, Comment, It's about Time: A Systems Thinking Analysis of the
Litigation Finance Industry and Its Effect on Settlement, 155 U. PA. L. REv. 503, 503
(2006); David Dagan, Lawsuit-Loan Companies Vex Attorneys, CENT. PENN Bus. J.,Jan.
27, 2006, at 3; Diane E. Lewis, With Interest, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 2, 2003, at Cl;
Michael Pollick, Business & Money: Betting on the Verdict; Lawyers Advance Plaintiffs
Money to Keep Lawsuits Going, in Hopes of Cashing in if a Suit Succeeds, SARASOTA HER-
ALD-TRIB., Jan. 12, 2003, at DI.
6. See Anthony J. Sebok, Dispatches From The Tort Wars, 85 TEX. L. REv. 1465,
1498 (2007).
7. Mike France, The Litigation Machine, Bus. WK., Jan. 29, 2001, available at
http://www.businessweek.com/2001/0l_05/b3717001.htm?scriptFramed (noting
that large corporations like General Motors and DuPont each have more than 100
in-house lawyers, dozens of outside counsel on retainer, giant budgets, high-tech
resources and access to firms like Defense Research Institute which has files on
50,000 expert witnesses).
[Vol. 53: p. 83
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tions, which can empower people without access to more traditional credit
sources. For businesses seeking financing to support litigation, practical
reality means there should be no legal impediments, beyond those that
exist for any business agreement, on any deal they and their funders un-
dertake. For individuals needing financial support to maintain litigation,
there are examples in other industries as well as in other countries for
regulating litigation funders and determining a reasonable rate of return.
Defendants have insurers to finance their litigation expenses; litigation fi-
nance firms merely play that same role for plaintiffs, leveling the playing
field.
Because this author and others have provided descriptions of the liti-
gation funding industry and its legal background in other articles, this arti-
cle will start with a very brief introduction to the industry's legal
problems. 8 Then there will be a review of the most recent cases involving
litigation financing to illustrate how courts address attacks on the industry
depending on whether the plaintiff/borrower is a business or an individ-
ual.9 Next, this article will provide a comparison between litigation financ-
ing and other subprime financing industries. 10 Section TV discusses the
concept of reasonable rate of return and how it applies to litigation financ-
ing.1' Section V discusses the litigation financing industry in Australia and
other countries and how it can be instructive for industry behavior and
regulation in the United States. 12 Finally, the article concludes that
merely because it is possible for litigation financing to be predatory, does
not mean it should be eliminated. 13 Litigation financing serves as a coun-
terbalance to a defendant's insurer so that a plaintiff has the wherewithal
to remain in the legal battle long enough to have a realistic opportunity to
achieve legal success. Litigation financing also serves as an alternative way
for businesses to manage risk and cash flow associated with legal proceed-
ings. Regulation of the industry should focus on data collection, trans-
parency and competition.
8. For a discussion of the industry's legal problems, see infra notes 14-25 and
accompanying text.
9. For a discussion of court approaches, see infra notes 26-106 and accompa-
nying text.
10. For a comparison of other subprime lending, see infra notes 107-49 and
accompanying text.
11. For a discussion of reasonable rates of return, see infra notes 150-75 and
accompanying text.
12. For a discussion of international litigation funding, see infra notes 176-250
and accompanying text.
13. For a discussion of why possible predatory practices should not eliminate
the entire industry, see infra notes 251-59 and accompanying text.
2008]
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II. THE LITIGATION FINANCING INDUSTRY
A. Background
"The litigation financing firms make non-recourse loans to plaintiffs
in exchange for a share of the proceeds of their lawsuits, if there are any.
If a plaintiff loses, nothing is repaid, and the lender loses the money ad-
vanced." ' 4 These arrangements have been problematic because they vio-
late state prohibitions against champerty, an agreement in which a third
party provides support for another's litigation in exchange for part of the
proceeds. 15 In addition, although these funding arrangements specifically
do not contain an absolute obligation on the part of the borrower to repay
the amount of money advanced, a basic element in the definition of usury,
some courts have viewed the arrangements as usurious. 1 6
The prohibition on champerty has existed since ancient Greek and
Roman times. 17 Its purpose was to keep third parties with no relationship
to the litigation from encouraging quarrels, frivolous litigation, resistance
to settlement, suppression of evidence and increased damages, all for their
own personal gain. 18 In the United States today, there is wide variation
among states' laws on champerty, but even where it is prohibited there
have always been major exceptions, the most notable being contingency
legal fees. 19 Moreover, the evils the prohibition was meant to discourage
14. Susan Lorde Martin, The Litigation Financing Industry: The Wild West of Fi-
nance Should Be Tamed Not Outlawed, 10 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 55, 55 (2004).
15. For a discussion of champerty and maintenance, see Syndicated Lawsuits,
supra note 1, at 485-97; Max Radin, Maintenance by Champerty, 24 CAL. L. REV. 48,
51-52 (1935). For a discussion of champerty and maintenance in foreign coun-
tries, see Campbells Cash & Carry Party Ltd. v. Fostif Party Ltd., (2006) 80 A.L.J.R.
1441 (Austl.) (describing development of law of maintenance and champerty in
UK, Australia and India). In a few states, champerty is not prohibited. See, e.g.,
Saladini v. Righellis, 687 N.E.2d 1224, 1224 (Mass. 1997); Weller v. Jersey City,
Hoboken & Peterson St. Ry. Co., 57 A. 730, 732 (N.J. Ch. 1904), affid, 68 N.J. Eq.
659 (N.J. 1905). In several others, courts have indicated that the doctrine of cham-
perty should not be rigidly enforced. See, e.g., Kraft v. Mason, 668 So. 2d 679, 682-
83 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (discussing decreased need for strict prohibitions on
champerty); Osprey, Inc. v. Cabana Ltd. P'ship, 532 S.E.2d 269, 279 (S.C. 2000)
(abolishing champerty as defense and expressing confidence that other morewell-
developed principles of law can accomplish same goals).
16. See, e.g., Rancman v. Interim Settlement Funding Corp., No. 20523, 2001
WL 1339487, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 31, 2001), affd, Rancman v. Interim Settle-
ment Funding Corp., 789 N.E.2d 217, 218 (Ohio 2003); see also Lawsuit Financial,
LLC v. Curry, 683 N.W.2d 233, 240 (Mich. Ct. App. 2004); Echeverria v. Estate of
Lindner, 2005 WL 1083704, at *1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 2, 2005) (unpublished dispo-
sition) (noting, in dicta, that litigation funding rate was "obviously usurious"). For
a description of usury in the context of litigation financing agreements, see Mar-
tin, supra note 2, at 89-92.
17. For a discussion of the history of champerty, see Radin, supra note 15 at
51-52 and accompanying text.
18. See A.L.G., Note, The Effect of Champerty on Contractual Liability, 79 L.Q. REV.
493, 494 (1963).
19. For a discussion of the various state laws addressing champerty, see Syndi-
cated Lawsuits, supra note 1, at 488-97.
[Vol. 53: p. 83
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are counteracted by lenders' desire to support only those lawsuits that are
likely to succeed and courts' abilities to sanction lawyers and parties who
bring frivolous suits.
The prohibition on usury also has an ancient history.20 Usury is gen-
erally defined as intentionally taking greater compensation than the law
allows for lending money to a borrower who has an absolute obligation to
repay with repayment not contingent on any other event.2 1 In the United
States, states' laws on usury are quite varied, but most states have statutes
setting interest rate limits and prohibiting usury.
In spite of potential champerty and usury pitfalls, there are more liti-
gation financing firms than ever before, 2 2 new firms are offering financing
to lawyers to pursue lawsuits, 23 and even hedge funds have started invest-
ing in lawsuits. 2 4 Nevertheless, at the same time the industry is becoming
larger and more mainstream, there are still lawsuits attempting to get
courts to invalidate litigation financing agreements.
B. Recent Legal Attacks on Litigation Financing Agreements
These cases generally arise when a plaintiff, usually an individual with
a personal injury claim who does not have enough money for living ex-
penses during the time between the injury and the disposition of the case,
accepts funds from a litigation funding firm. The agreement details the
amount advanced, the fact that the plaintiff/borrower will not have to re-
pay the funds unless the claim succeeds, and if the claim succeeds, the
amount the plaintiff/borrower will have to pay, usually an amount that
increases as the time between the advance of funds and resolution of the
case increases. 25 When the underlying case is resolved, the plaintiff/bor-
rower refuses to pay the funding firm the agreed upon amount and either
20. SeeJeremy Bentham, Letter II., in DEFENCE OF USURY; SHOWING THE IMPOL-
ICY OF THE PRESENT LEGAL RESTRAINTS ON THE TERMS OF PECUNIARY BARGAINS 9
(1787); Paul G. Hayeck, An Economic Analysis of the Justification for Usury Laws, 15
ANN. REV. BANKING L. 253, 253 (1996); Wayne A.M. Visser & Alastair McIntosh, A
Short Review of the Historical Critique of Usury, in ACCOUNTING, BUSINESS AND FINAN-
CIAL HISTORY 175 (vol. 8) (1998).
21. For a discussion of usury, see Martin, supra note 2, at 89-91.
22. Entering "litigation financing" on Google will provide more than fifty dif-
ferent funding firms. Search Results for "litigation financing," http://
www.google.com/search?hl=en&q=litigation+inancing&btnG=Google+Search (last
visited Sept. 18, 2007). For a discussion of litigation funding firms and a list of
some of them, see Martin, supra note 2, at 99-100, nn.106-18.
23. See, e.g., Legal Asset Funding v. Veneski, No. 3:04-CV-01156, 2006 WL
2623884 (M.D. Pa. Sep. 12, 2006); Counsel Financial Services, http://
www.counselfin.com (last visited Apr. 10, 2007); Attorney Funding Group, LLC,
http://www.attorneyfundinggroup.com (last visited Oct. 29, 2007).
24. Mary Jacoby, UK. Auditions Litigation, WALL ST. J., Jan. 16, 2007, at A12
(noting that hedge funds, insurers and private investors are providing support for
lawsuits in exchange for share of any award).
25. See, e.g., CapTran, http://www.captran.com/aboutfees.asp (last visited
Oct. 16, 2007).
2008]
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sues for a rescission of the agreement claiming champerty or usury, or is
sued for breach of contract.
The most notorious of the cases was Rancman v. Interim Settlement
Funding Corp.,26 because the Ohio Supreme Court resurrected the prohibi-
tion against champerty to invalidate the funding agreements although the
plaintiff/borrower never raised champerty as an issue, and the financing
firm was not given the opportunity to speak to the issue.2 7 Furthermore,
the case was interesting because the intermediate appellate court in Ohio
invalidated the agreements on the grounds of usury, holding that the
plaintiffs underlying case was a sure winner; and, therefore, the funding
firm made a loan, not a contingent cash advance. 28 The Ohio Supreme
Court obviously wanted to affirm the lower court and void the agreement,
but did not want to determine "the threshold level of risk necessary for a
contingent advance to be treated as an investment rather than a loan,"
29
instead drawing on the champerty doctrine that, it admitted, had "lain
dormant in Ohio courts."3 °
Rancman is probably an example of bad facts making bad law. The
plaintiff was a passenger injured in a car accident. 31 The circumstances of
the injury led the court to believe that there was no real probability the
plaintiff would not be paid for her injury.3 2 Nevertheless, her litigation
financing firm charged her over 280% in fees for money it advanced.
3 3
Although the plaintiff had advice of her counsel regarding the agreement,
which she chose to reject, and there was no evidence about the firm's
profit margin, the court was not going to uphold an agreement with that
percentage number.
Poor individuals are not the only recipients of funds from litigation
funding firms.34 These arrangements are becoming increasingly common
in business situations, where they began, and it is more likely that courts
will uphold agreements between a funding firm and a business than be-
tween a funding firm and an individual. In one of the most recent re-
ported cases, the Texas Court of Appeals upheld a litigation funding
agreement against Anglo-Dutch Petroleum International, Inc.3 5 The case
26. 789 N.E.2d 217 (Ohio 2003).
27. See id. at 219-20.
28. See Rancman v. Interim Settlement Funding Corp., No. 20523, 2001 WL
1339487, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 31, 2001).
29. See Rancman, 789 N.E.2d. at 219.
30. See id. at 220. For detailed descriptions of these Ohio cases, see Syndicated
Lawsuits, supra note 1, at 59-62; Martin, supra note 2, at 92-94.
31. Rancman, 789 N.E.2d at 219-20.
32. See Rancman, 2001 WL 1339487, at *2.
33. See id. at *1.
34. See, e.g., CapTran, http://www.captran.com/aboutfees.asp (last visited
Oct. 16, 2007) (giving litigation funding to poor individuals and attorneys); see also
Anglo-Dutch Petroleum Int'l, Inc. v. Haskell, 193 S.W.3d 87 (Tex. App. 2006) (liti-
gation funding to business for trade secret appropriation case).
35. See Haskell, 193 S.W.3d 87.
[Vol. 53: p. 83
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is a good example of the kind of circumstances in which a business plain-
tiff might want to secure financial support for its litigation from someone
else, the potential pitfalls for litigation financing firms, and the reaction of
courts to these kinds of facts.
Anglo-Dutch had a pending $650 million lawsuit against Halliburton
and Ramco for misappropriating trade secrets and breaching confidential-
ity agreements. 36 Because Anglo-Dutch did not have the resources to run
its business and prosecute this very expensive case, it sought, unsuccess-
fully, to borrow money from commercial banks using the lawsuit as collat-
eral.3 7 Then it solicited other investors and received $560,000 in
exchange for shares of the proceeds of the Halliburton lawsuit if there
were any.
38
The agreements between Anglo-Dutch and its investors provided that
Anglo-Dutch was selling interests in any cash recovery it would receive
from the Halliburton lawsuit, and that if there were no cash recovery, An-
glo-Dutch would not have to return their money or pay anything to the
investors.39 If there were a cash recovery, then Anglo-Dutch would pay
each investor "the sum total of: (a) its Investment, plus, (b) an amount
equal to its Investment, plus (c) a return on its Investment .... ,,40 The
formula used to calculate the return on investment (part c) generally pro-
vided for an amount equal to the amount of the loan multiplied by the
number of days between the making of the loan and the disposition of the
Halliburton case divided by 365.41 In other words, after a year the return
to investors on the money they advanced would be 200%.
Anglo-Dutch received an $81 million judgment in the Halliburton
case and entered into a settlement agreement with Halliburton without
disclosing the terms.42 Anglo-Dutch then requested its investors to accept
less than the agreed upon amount asserting that their agreements were
"contrary to Texas public policy and unenforceable under Texas law." 43
The investors refused and sued Anglo-Dutch claiming breach of contract
and other wrongs. 44 In its defense, Anglo-Dutch asserted that the litiga-
tion funding agreements were usurious loans, or they were illegal unregis-
tered securities, both of which violate Texas public policy. 4
5
To support its usurious loan claim, Anglo-Dutch used the Rancman
argument, that is, its case was a sure thing, and in reality, there was no
36. See id. at 90.
37. See id.
38. See id. at 91.
39. See id. at 92.
40. Id.
41. See id. n.5.
42. See id. at 91.
43. Id. (quotations omitted).
44. See id.
45. See id. at 93.
2008]
7
Martin: Litigation Financing: Another Subprime Industry that Has a place
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2008
VILLANovA LAW REVIEW
contingency."6 The Texas Court of Appeals responded in a much more
sophisticated way than the Ohio Court of Appeals. The Texas court distin-
guished between "contingency" and "risk."'4 7 By the unambiguous terms
of their agreement, Anglo-Dutch did not have an absolute obligation to
repay its investors; its obligation was contingent upon its cash recovery in
the Halliburton suit.4 8 Therefore, the agreements cannot be usurious.
49
Usury depends on a contingency, not on the amount of risk.50 It does not
matter, according to the Texas court, whether or not the investors were
exposed to little or no risk. 51 The reality of the contingency, according to
the court, was illustrated by the fact that the $81 million judgment Anglo-
Dutch received was far less than its anticipated damages of $650 million. 52
Furthermore, to ignore the unambiguous contingency in the agreement
would render every successful business venture subject to a usury claim. 53
Once a business venture was successful, a borrower could claim that the
investment agreement was really a loan, and therefore, should be voided
because it was usurious.5 4 Investors, who undertook a financial risk, ad-
vancing funds because of promised returns, would be denied the benefit
of their bargain. 55
The Texas court also addressed the Anglo-Dutch claim that because
its agreements with investors were champertous, they were ipso facto void
as against public policy.5 6 The court averred that the agreements did not
"prey on financially desperate plaintiffs."57 To the contrary, it was Anglo-
Dutch who solicited investors when it could not obtain a loan from a com-
mercial bank, and the investment returns were bargained for by the par-
ties. 58 The investors did not exert any control over the lawsuit against
Halliburton, and it is more likely that the agreements would encourage
settlement rather than prolong litigation.5 9 Investors would not fund a
frivolous lawsuit when the only way they can recover their investment is if
the lawsuit is successful, and they would not prolong litigation when their
agreements were structured in such a way that a quicker settlement was in
their interest.60 Accordingly, the Texas court concluded that the litigation
financing agreements did not violate Texas public policy and affirmed the
46. See id. at 94.
47. See id. at 96.
48. See id.
49. Id. at 97.
50. Id.
51. See id. at 96-98.
52. See id. at 98.
53. See id. at 99 n.8.
54. See id.
55. See id.
56. See id. at 104.
57. Id.
58. See id.
59. See id. at 104-05.
60. See id. at 105.
[Vol. 53: p. 83
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lower court's decision awarding the investors $2,556,105.51 in actual dam-
ages and $52,001.80 in attorney fees. 61
The Texas appellate court in Anglo-Dutch, while deciding this case of
first impression in Texas, was clearly comfortable enforcing the litigation
financing agreement, viewing it as an investment arrangement. 62 The
contrast with the opinion of the District Court of Appeal of Florida six
months earlier in Fausone v. U.S. Claims, Inc.63 is striking, but predictable
given the facts of the case. A dump truck struck Victoria Fausone while
she was riding her bicycle. 6 4 Five months after the accident she entered
into an agreement with Advance Legal Funding, LLC ("ALF"). 65 By the
terms of the agreement, she received $3000 in October 2000 and agreed
to pay ALF $6000 if she settled her claim before May 1, 2001, or $9000
plus 18% interest if a settlement occurred after that date.66 She would pay
nothing if she lost her lawsuit. 67 The court noted that the interest rate in
the agreement was never less than 200%.68
Fausone then entered into an agreement with Advance Settlement
Funding, Inc. ("ASF"), and by its terms she received $2000 for which she
would repay no more than $4250 depending on when she received the
proceeds from the lawsuit. 69 The court noted that the interest rate was
approximately 90%.70 Fausone entered into two more agreements with
ASF agreeing to pay a total of $8075 from the proceeds of her lawsuit.7 1
She then contacted U.S. Claims ("USC") seeking more money.72
Fausone's attorneys reviewed the agreement with USC, sent it to USC and
provided USC with information about her case so USC could decide
whether to advance funds to her.73 USC helped her consolidate her loans
and pay off the earlier ones at a discount.7 4 The agreement provided that
Fausone would not have to pay anything to USC if she failed to recover any
money from her lawsuit, and that if the proceeds of the lawsuit were less
than the amount that she owed USC, USC would be entitled to 100% of
the proceeds from the lawsuit.75 USC advanced a total of $30,000 to
Fausone, and their agreement contained a repayment schedule that re-
quired her to repay $42,890 by a certain date, along with increasing
61. See id. at 94, 105.
62. See id. at 100.
63. 915 So. 2d 626 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
64. See id. at 627.
65. See id.
66. See id.
67. Id.
68. See id.
69. See id.
70. See id.
71. See id.
72. See id.
73. See id.
74. See id. at 628.
75. See id.
2008]
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amounts if her case took longer to resolve. 76 The court noted that al-
though these terms were better than those in the agreements with ALF
and ASF, "the interest rate for these loans was still well above the rates
normally allowed for consumer transactions." 7 7 The court did not discuss
whether Fausone was able to get loans from commercial banks or other
traditional sources. Presumably, she could not do so, or certainly her at-
torneys would have suggested that course. The agreement also provided
that any disputes would be settled by arbitration in either Pennsylvania or
Delaware. 78
About a year and a half after Fausone and USC signed the agreement,
Fausone's attorney notified USC that Fausone's claim had been settled for
more than $200,000 but that Fausone had instructed him not to pay
USC. 79 USC proceeded with an arbitration in Philadelphia.8 0 The arbi-
trator offered Fausone the opportunity to appear by telephone, but she
did not, and USC was awarded $72,117 with a provision that the amount
would continue to increase in accordance with the schedule in the agree-
ment if Fausone failed to pay.8 1 Because Fausone made but then withdrew
a motion to vacate the arbitration award, the appellate court had no
choice but to affirm the lower court's confirmation of the arbitration
award after USC had filed a motion urging that action.8 2
Unlike the Texas court in Anglo-Dutch, the Florida court was dissatis-
fied with the outcome of this case and could not resist providing a section
in its opinion called "A Possible Need for Regulation." 83 The court
opined that:
A person who is the victim of an accident should not be fur-
ther victimized by loan companies charging interest rates that are
higher than the risks associated with the transaction .... [A]
company that only loaned money when it was secured by high-
grade personal injury claims would seem to be able to charge a
lower interest rate than some of the rates described in this opin-
ion, even when the arrangement is a nonrecourse loan .... The
purchase agreement in this case is one-sided and designed to pre-
vent a Florida citizen from having access to a local court or an-
other local dispute resolution forum. Such agreements create
76. See id.
77. Id.
78. See id.
79. See id. at 628-29.
80. See id. at 629 (noting that case went to American Arbitration Association
in Philadelphia).
81. See id. at 629 n.5 (summarizing the repayment schedule contained in ini-
tial and amended agreements). The court also noted that it was unclear as to
whether the amount owed had continued to increase during the litigation and
arbitration proceedings. See id.
82. See id. at 629.
83. See id. at 629-30.
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confusion concerning the party who actually owns and controls
the lawsuit, and creates risks that the attorney-client privilege will
be waived unintentionally.8 4
The court then suggested that the Florida legislature examine the litiga-
tion financing industry and, perhaps, provide statutory protection from it
for Florida's citizens.8 5
The court's conclusion in dicta is not necessarily a poor one, but its
reasoning is poor. It would seem that when the court saw a 200% interest
rate, the court concluded that the plaintiff/borrower was being "victim-
ized," although (1) Fausone had aid of counsel in pursuing the financing
arrangements; (2) Fausone probably needed the money and could not get
it from traditional lenders or elsewhere; (3) there are many litigation fi-
nancing firms, so there is probably some competition in setting fees; and
(4) the court did not indicate it had any information about the cost of
money to the litigation financing firm, its overall success rate in collecting
fees, its overall rate of return, or anything else about its business. Thus, it
is a good idea for legislatures to examine the litigation financing industry,
but it is conclusory for the Florida court to assume the victimization of this
plaintiff/borrower.
Several months before Fausone, a case was heard in a New York trial
court that had an outcome different from either Fausone or Rancman but,
like both those cases, is an excellent example ofjudicial antipathy to litiga-
tion financing arrangements for individual plaintiff/borrowers.8 6 The
case was an inquest in which the court had to determine only the issue of
damages suffered by Juan Echeverria, an undocumented laborer, when he
fell from an elevated platform on his job site and sustained significant
head and back injuries.8 7 Among the damages claimed was money owed
to LawCash, a litigation funding firm that had advanced $25,000 to
Echeverria at what the court called "an obviously usurious rate of interest
of 3.85% per month compounded monthly."8 8 The funds were used to
pay for surgery and expenses associated with it.89 The court referred to
Rancman, noting that "the Ohio Supreme Court is the highest court of
that state and should be shown proper deference."9 0 With obvious dis-
may, the New York court opined that it could not find Echeverria's agree-
ment void on the grounds of champerty because New York law prohibits
such a finding under the circumstances. 9 1
84. Id. at 630.
85. See id.
86. See Echeverria v. Estate of Lindner, No. 018666/2002, 2005 WL 1083704,
at *1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 2, 2005) (unpublished table decision).
87. See id.
88. Id.
89. See id. at *2.
90. Id. at *6-7 (referencing Rancman v. Interim Settlement Funding Cop.,789
N.E.2d 217, 220-21 (Ohio 2003).
91. See id. at *6.
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First, under New York law, an investment in a lawsuit can be champer-
tous only if the investment is made "'with the intent and for the purpose
of bringing an action or proceeding thereon." 9 2 In this case, Echeverria
had already started legal proceedings before entering his agreement with
LawCash and, according to the agreement, he remained in control of the
lawsuit.93 Furthermore, the New York Attorney General had recently en-
tered into an agreement with a major litigation financing firm in the state,
requiring the firm to make full disclosure of the total amount and the
interest rate the plaintiff/borrower would owe, to provide a five day right-
to-cancel period, and to obtain from the plaintiffs attorney a statement
that the agreement was reviewed with and explained to the plaintiff.94
Thus, the court reluctantly concluded that "the Attorney General seems to
have given these types of funding institutions his blessing." 95
The court then proceeded to follow the path of the intermediate ap-
pellate court in Rancman, the path rejected by the Ohio Supreme Court
because it did not want to decide when a business risk was too low to qual-
ify as a contingency.96 The New York court declared that Echeverria's case
was "'a sure thing' [and], therefore, it is a loan, not an investment with
great risk. If it is a loan, then the interest rate charged is usurious .... -97
The court set aside the agreement and awarded the principal of $25,000
and interest of 16% per annum, the maximum rate allowable for a loan
under New York law. 98 The court called on the New York legislature to
examine litigation funding firms to decide if they are engaging in cham-
perty,99 and it called on the Attorney General to issue an opinion letter
with rules for litigation funders to protect consumers.10 0
Once again, a courtjust did not like the idea of a business charging a
high interest rate to an individual who was pursuing a lawsuit. The court
acknowledged it had "pontificated"10 1 in its opinion but nevertheless
could not refrain from predicting that litigation funding agreements
could lead to premature settlements or no settlements at all, while at the
same time worrying that people would bring lawsuits with a low likelihood
of success. 10 2 The court did recognize that litigation financing arrange-
92. Id. at *4 (citing N.Y. JUD. LAw §§ 488, 489).
93. See id. at *5.
94. See id. at *3.
95. Id. at *8.
96. See Rancman v. Interim Settlement Funding Corp., No. 20523, 2001 WL
1339487, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 30, 2001) (explaining factors used by litigation
firms to determine amount of risk involved in individual personal injury case),
affid, 789 N.E.2d 217 (Ohio 2003).
97. Echeverria v. Estate of Lindner, No. 018666/2002, 2005 WL 1083704, at
*8 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 2, 2005) (unpublished table decision).
98. See id.
99. See id. at *7.
100. See id. at *8.
101. Id. at *12.
102. See id. at *7-8.
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ments would allow low income plaintiffs to bring lawsuits they would oth-
erwise not have the resources to pursue;10 3 however, it did not mention
that it was unlikely that a funder would finance a frivolous suit. Most im-
portantly, it incorrectly assumed that an investment creates a "great risk"
for the investor; and absent this great risk, the purported investor is
merely a lender making a loan and is bound by usury laws. 10 4 The Texas
court in Anglo-Dutch got it right when it recognized that an investment
does not become a loan merely because the level of risk is low. 10 5 The
New York court in this case reflected a general dislike of subprime
arrangements.
1II. SUBPRIME LENDING
Litigation financing is not a unique industry. It is related to a wide-
spread subprime lending industry that includes loans for home mortgages,
payday loans, car-title loans and rent-to-own stores. A similarity among
these examples is that they all involve a rate of return that is higher than
that of traditional commercial lenders because the recipients are individu-
als who do not qualify for prime loans. 10 6 Funding recipients in the case
of litigation financing may differ from borrowers in the other situations
because they are not always poor individuals; sometimes they are business-
people making business decisions to share the costs, risks and potential
rewards of their litigation. It is the situation of the poor individual bor-
rower, however, that creates antipathy toward the entire subprime indus-
try. Failure of subprime home mortgage lenders is the most recent
example of general political hysteria about the idea of subprime lend-
ing.10 7 Amid the decrial of these arrangements, there should also be con-
sideration of the important services they provide and how to maximize
their positive aspects while minimizing their potential abuses. A brief look
at various subprime lending situations provides insight into litigation fi-
nancing agreements.
103. See id. at *7.
104. See id. at *8.
105. See generally Anglo-Dutch Petroleum Int'l v. Haskell, 193 S.W.3d 87, 96-99
(Tex. App. 2006) (discussing impact low level of risk has on investment), reh'g
denied, Dec. 15, 2006. For further discussion of the court's holding in Anglo-Dutch,
see supra notes 35-62 and accompanying text.
106. For a brief discussion of subprime and predatory lending, see Martin,
supra note 14, at 63-67.
107. See, e.g., Mortgage Market Turmoil: Causes and Consequences: Hearings Before
the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 110th Cong. (2007) (statement
of Sen. Christopher J. Dodd, Chairman, Comm. on S. Banking, Housing, and Ur-
ban Affairs) (recognizing present-day implosion of the mortgage market); see also
Greg Ip and Damian Paletta, Lending Oversight: Regulators Scrutinized in Mortgage
Meltdown, WALL ST. J., Mar. 22, 2007, at Al.
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A. Home Mortgages
In March of 2007, Senator Robert Menendez of New Jersey de-
nounced "the consumer exploitation occurring in subprime lending...
[by] [u]nscrupulous predatory lenders [who] prey upon the innocent and
unsuspecting."' 0 8 There is no widely accepted legal definition of preda-
tory lending, but it usually refers to transactions in which lenders try to
fool or intimidate consumers into signing loan agreements that the bor-
rowers cannot afford and that do not meet industry standards. 10 9 The
U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development and the U.S. Trea-
sury Department issued a report in 2000 that described four different
predatory practices in home mortgage lending: (1) loan flipping, that is,
repeatedly refinancing loans in a short period of time and including high
fees in each new loan, reducing the equity in the home; (2) excessive fee
packing, that is, adding very high fees to the loan amount instead of hav-
ing fees paid up front, so that consumers are often unaware of the fees;
(3) lending without regard for the ability to repay; and (4) fraud, that is,
appraisers and brokers conspiring to inflate property values. 110 Senator
Christopher Dodd of Connecticut reported that:
a sort of frenzy gripped the market over the past several years as
many brokers and lenders started selling these complicated mort-
gages to lower-income borrowers, many with less than perfect
credit, who they knew, or should have known, would not be able
to afford to repay these loans when the higher payments kicked
in.111
Senator Dodd then described a widow with children and an elderly retired
woman, "the human tragedies," who were going to lose their homes be-
cause of predatory lending. 112
Subprime lending, on the other hand, does not involve deceit, but is
offered to people who have a history of credit problems at an interest rate
that is higher thah the rate available to those with good credit. 113 The
higher rate accommodates the additional risks involved in lending to peo-
108. 153 CONG. Rc. S3077, 3114 (daily ed. Mar. 14, 2007) (statement of Sen.
Menendez).
109. See Freddie Mac, Combating Predatory Lending, http://www.freddiemac.
com/corporate/about/howwe-help/predlend.html (last visited Oct. 8, 2007)
(defining term "predatory lending"); see also U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, CON.
SUMER PROTECTION: FEDERAL AND STATE AGENCIES FACE CHALLENGES IN COMBATING
PREDATORY LENDING 1 (2004).
110. See Giang Ho & Anthony Pennington-Cross, The Varying Effects of Predatory
Lending Laws on High-Cost Mortgage Applications, 89 FED. RES. BANK OF ST. Louis
REv. 39, 39-40 (2007) (citing U.S. DEP'T OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEv. & U.S. DEP'T
OF THE TREASURY, CURBING PREDATORY HOME MORTGAGE LENDING 2 (2000)).
111. Statement of Sen. Dodd, supra note 107.
112. Id.
113. See Freddie Mac, Subprime Lending, http://www.freddiemac.com/corpo-
rate/about/howwehelp/subprime.html (last visited Oct. 8, 2007).
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pie with poor credit histories or no credit history at all. 114 There is very
little subprime lending by national banks. Most subprime mortgage lend-
ing is done by non-bank lenders and brokers fueled by the purchase of
these loans in the secondary market by hedge funds and private equity
investors. 11 5 In 2005 and 2006, about 20% of all mortgage originations
were subprime.
116
At the end of 2006 the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the
Federal Reserve Board, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the
Office of Thrift Supervision and the National Credit Union Administra-
tion issued guidelines for nontraditional mortgages." 7 In fact, the guide-
lines apply only to national banks that are not making most of the
subprime loans; nevertheless, the guidelines are instructive for seeing what
these federal agencies view as appropriate for maintaining financial op-
portunities for poorer consumers while protecting them from abuses."
8
The guidelines have two main thrusts. First, they require an analysis of a
borrower's repayment capacity based on verified data rather than on
credit scores and other assumptions.llO Second, they require providing
clear and balanced information so that borrowers are aware of the risks of
the loans. 120
Because most subprime lenders are regulated by the states, not by
federal agencies, states have also been active in attempting to limit abusive
lending practices. At least thirty-six states and the District of Columbia
have enacted anti-predatory lending laws. 12' In 2006, the Conference of
State Bank Supervisors (CSBS) contracted with the National Association of
Securities Dealers, Inc. (NASD) to develop a national licensing system that
contains data about every company and mortgage professional and is now
available to consumers. 122
114. See id.
115. See Mortgage Market Turmoil: Causes and Consequences: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, l10th Cong. 2-3 (2007) (Statement of
Emory W. Rushton, Senior Deputy Comptroller, Chief National Bank Examiner,
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency).
116. See id. at 4 (noting percentages of subprime mortgage originations).
117. See OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, ET AL., INTERAGENCY
GUIDANCE ON NONTRADITIONAL MORTGAGE PRODUCT RisKs 1 (2006), available at
http://www.ots.treas.gov/docs/2/25244.pdf.
118. See id.
119. See id. at 5 (explaining combination of factors other than credit scores
and assumptions that should help determine borrower's repayment capacity).
120. See id. at 18, 20.
121. See Mortgage Market Turmoil: Causes and Consequences: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 110th Cong., 2007 WL 867455
(F.D.C.H.) (testimony of Joseph A. Smith, Jr., North Carolina Commissioner of
Banks). The first anti-predatory lending law was enacted in North Carolina in
1999. See id. (referencing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-1.1E (1999)).
122. For a discussion of the actions of CSBS and NASD, see Testimony of
Joseph A. Smith, supra note 121.
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If the federal guidelines or state lending laws are hypothetically ap-
plied in the litigation financing situation, there seems to be considerably
less potential for harm than in the subprime mortgage arena. If the plain-
tiffs/borrowers do not recover in their lawsuits, they do not have to repay
the money advanced. There is no harm that approaches losing one's
home. Furthermore, the plaintiffs/borrowers have lawyers who are addi-
tional sources of information about the agreements they are undertaking.
The political outrage in the subprime mortgage situation is fueled by con-
sumers losing their homes. In the litigation financing situation, outrage is
caused merely by the amount of the interest rate, despite the fact that
these borrowers cannot get the money elsewhere at a lower rate, and the
fact that they have expert advisors.
Sandra Braunstein, the Federal Reserve Board's Director of Con-
sumer Affairs, told a U.S. House Oversight and Government Reform sub-
committee that bank regulators must keep incentives for subprime lenders
so people with poor credit histories will continue to be able to obtain
mortgages.' 23 She described the goal as eliminating unfair and abusive
practices while preserving incentives. 124 The same could be said for litiga-
tion financing and, therefore, the licensing system proposed for mortgage
professionals should be similarly efficacious for litigation funders.
B. Payday and Car-Title Loans
Payday and car-itle loans are other examples of subprime lending
that consumer groups, academics and the popular media have been vigor-
ously attacking as predatory for at least the last decade. 125 In a typical
payday loan arrangement, the borrower gives the lender a post-dated
123. See Business Briefs: Preserving Incentives for Subprime Lenders, NEWSDAY, May
22, 2007, at A52.
124. See id.; see also Austan Goolsbee, 'Irresponsible' Mortgages Have Opened Doors
to Many of the Excluded, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 2007, at 2 (warning against tightening
regulations on subprime lending too much); Readjusting Mortgages-Subprime Loans
Open Door to Home Ownership, but Must Be Regulated, NEWSDAY, Apr. 9, 2007, at A40
(editorializing that subprime lending should be regulated, not banned).
125. See, e.g., Creola Johnson, Payday Loans: Shrewd Business or Predatory Lend-
ing? 87 MINN. L. REv. 1, 25-97 (2002); Pearl Chin, Note, Payday Loans: The Case for
Federal Legislation, 2004 U. ILL. L. REv. 723, 753 (2004) (denouncing payday loans
as unconscionable and arguing for increased regulation by Congress of payday
loan industry);JEAN ANN Fox, CONSUMER FEDERATION OF AMERICA, THE GROWTH OF
LEGAL LOAN SHARKING: A REPORT ON THE PAYDAY LOAN INDUSTRY 1 (1998), http://
www.consumerfed.org/pdfs/TheGrowth_ofLegal-Loan-Sharking-1998.pdf;
Adam Geller, Payday May Day: Short-Term Lenders under Fire-Critics Say They Use
Loophole in Law to Charge Usurious Rates, HOUSTON CHRON.,Jan. 26, 2001, at IC;Joe
Harwood, Fast Loans Cost Oregon Consumers a Bundle, EUGENE REG.-GUARD, Nov. 10,
1997; David Ivanovich, Check Cashers or Loan Sharks? Consumer Group Blasts Pricey
Industry, Practice of "Payday Loans," HOUSTON CHRON., Aug. 22, 1997, at 2C; Jane
Bryant Quinn, Dragged Down by Debt: People with Shaky Credit Are Getting Suckered by
Risky Loans Against Their Paychecks, Homes-and Even Cars, NEWSWEEK, May 7, 2007,
at 49; Sherri Williams, Group Seeks Limits on Payday Iending, COLUMBUS DISPATCH,
May 8, 2007, at lB.
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check for the amount of the loan principal plus the finance charge, and
the lender gives the borrower a loan in cash with repayment due in a short
time, usually two weeks (the borrower's next payday).1 26 At the end of the
loan period, either the borrower pays the principal and the finance charge
or the lender cashes the check. 127 Examples of such arrangements that
have been cited in litigation include a $200 loan for a two-week period
with a $25 dollar finance charge for an annual percentage rate of
268.38%128 and a $400 loan for a two-week period with a $50 finance
charge for an annual percentage rate of 325.89%.129 Even more burden-
some than these initial agreements are the rollovers borrowers often un-
dertake because they cannot pay off their loans and fees when they come
due. One lawsuit described a borrower who rolled over loans twenty-four
times in fifteen months, borrowing $400, paying $1,364 and still owing
$248.130
Borrowers getting car-title loans will usually borrow between $250 and
$2,500 for thirty days, giving the lenders their titles and a set of duplicate
car keys as security. 13 ' Borrowers pay a fee up front which creates an in-
terest rate above 100%, and if they cannot pay when the loan comes due,
they are charged another fee plus interest. 132 If they cannot pay the fee
and interest, they lose their cars.' 33 In one case the borrower took a
$1,000 loan and used her 1997 Saturn as collateral. 134 Over the next eigh-
teen months, she paid the lender $4,000, more than she had paid for her
car when she bought it, but the principal never decreased, and she still
owed $1,200 despite paying $220 each month plus several late fees and
other penalties. 13
5
Most states now regulate payday and car-title loans by either prohibit-
ing them or putting caps on their interest rates; nevertheless, online lend-
ers get around the rules by locating in states or international sites with
weak regulations. 136 On a federal level, Congress included in the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 2007 a limit of 36% as the annual
126. See, e.g., Cash in a Flash v. McCullough, 853 N.E.2d 533, 535-36 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2006).
127. See id. at 536.
128. See id. at 535.
129. See Midwest Check Cashing, Inc. v. Richey, 728 N.W.2d 396, 397 (Iowa
2007).
130. See Fox, supra note 125, at 6.
131. See Quinn, supra note 125.
132. See id.
133. See id.
134. See Marc Perrusquia, Suit, Bill Go after "Gouge".- In 18 Months, $4,000 Paid
on $1,000 Loan, MEMPHIS COM. APPEAL, Feb. 8, 2007, at Al.
135. See id.
136. See Eileen Ambrose, High-Cost Borrowing-Internet Payday Loans: Easy Cash
or Shark Attack?, NEWSDAY, Dec. 24, 2004, at E2.
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percentage rate payday lenders may charge soldiers and their spouses. 137
Senator Talent noted that military families pay about $80 million in pay-
day loan fees each year with average annual percentage rates between
400% and 800%. 138 He cited the case of one naval petty officer who took
a $300 payday loan in 2003, borrowed to service the fee, and by the begin-
ning of 2004 had paid about $5,000 in interest on $1,800 in payday loans
from four different lenders. 13 9 Consumer advocates have praised the fed-
eral legislation, but have asked why its protection does not cover everyone
instead of just military families.' 40
The high interest rate is a similarity between these kinds of loans and
litigation financing but, once again, the differences are striking. Senator
Talent described the young men and women serving in the military and
how they are affected by payday loans: they are just out of high school;
they are not financially sophisticated; when they cannot pay back the loans
and interest, they go into bankruptcy; then they cannot get security clear-
ance, and they cannot do their jobs.14 1 Recipients of litigation financing
are in much different situations. First, they have lawyers representing
them who know and understand the terms of the financing agreements.
They are receiving professional advice that they may or may not decide to
follow. The agreement is not going to cause them to lose their homes,
their cars, their pay or their jobs. The agreement is going to enable them
to maintain a lawsuit through which they may collect a substantial amount
of money. If, in fact, they lose their lawsuits, they keep the funds advanced
to them and do not have to pay anything at all.
C. Rent-to-Own
Finally, predatory lending discussions often include information on
rent-to-own transactions. 14 2 In the typical rent-to-own transaction, a con-
sumer acquires household goods by making weekly or monthly pay-
ments.143 Then, at the end of each week or month, the consumer decides
whether to return the goods with no further obligation or to keep the
goods and to continue making weekly or monthly payments. 14 4 The con-
sumer can purchase the goods by renting them for an agreed-upon num-
137. See 152 CONG. REc. S6323, 6406 (daily ed. June 22, 2006) (statement of
Sen. Talent).
138. See id.
139. See id.
140. See, e.g., Quinn, supra note 125; Williams, supra note 125.
141. See 152 CONG. REc. S6405-1 (daily ed. June 22, 2006) (statement of Sen.
Talent).
142. See, e.g., Press Release, Defense Dep't Documents: U.S. Navy Releases,
Service Members Find Out about Predatory Lending (Feb. 17, 2007).
143. See Susan Lorde Martin & Nancy White Huckins, Consumer Advocates Vs.
The Rent-to-Own Industry: Reaching a Reasonable Accommodation, 34 AM. Bus. L.J. 385,
385 (1997).
144. See id.
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ber of weeks, typically seventy-eight weeks or eighteen months, and then
paying an additional sum. 145
When consumers litigate rent-to-own contracts, these contracts shock
judges because they often require the consumers to pay a sum much
greater than the retail value of the rented item. For example, in one case,
a consumer had to pay $1455.90, after sixty-nine weekly payments of
$21.10, to own a washer and dryer retailing for only $800.146 In another
case, a consumer had to pay $1643.15, after nineteen monthly payments of
$77.96 plus $4.29 (tax), $5.35 (liability waiver fee) and an additional pay-
ment of $161.91 to own a washer and dryer retailing for only $600.147
Beyond the numbers themselves, the transactions also shock judges
because they largely affect low-income consumers. These consumers are
too poor to pay cash for the appliance, have a poor credit history barring
credit elsewhere, and, after making most of their rental payments, which
exceed the retail value of the appliance, have had these appliances taken
away when they failed to make the last payment. Courts faced with rent-to-
own cases have not assessed the rate of return of the businesses, but have
concluded, merely on the face of their charges, that their business prac-
tices were unconscionable. 148
An analysis of rent-to-own businesses suggested that their financial
format made them much more profitable than comparable traditional
stores selling household goods;149 therefore, substantive regulation of
rent-to-own excessive fees might benefit consumers by lowering their costs
without driving rent-to-owns out of business, which would lower consum-
ers' opportunities as well. Unfortunately, a similar assessment of litigation
financing firms cannot be performed because, unlike the largest rent-to-
own businesses, they are privately held and the dozen or so members of
the American Litigation Financing Association, an industry trade associa-
tion, were unwilling to provide information about the interest rate they
charge, how they assess risk, how often they do not recover funds ad-
vanced or any other information that would allow a realistic assessment
about whether or not they are overcharging their borrowers.
D. Litigation Financing Equalizes Defendants' Insurance
The above descriptions of a variety of subprime lending situations in-
dicate two differences between them and litigation financing: first, if a
home mortgage, a payday loan, a car-title loan or a rent-to-own transaction
is predatory, the consumer may be much worse off than if he or she had
145. See id.
146. See Miller v. Colortyme, Inc., 518 N.W.2d 544, 546 (Minn. 1994).
147. See Rent-A-Center, Inc. v. Hall, 510 N.W.2d 789, 791 (Wis. Ct. App.
1993), rev. denied, 115 N.W.2d 715 (Wis. 1994).
148. See, e.g., Perez v. Rent-A-Center, Inc., 892 A.2d 1255, 1275 (N.J. 2006);
Green v. Continental Rentals, 678 A.2d 759, 766 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1994).
149. See Martin & Huckins, supra note 143, at 415-17.
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never engaged in the transaction at all; second, in all these situations an
unsophisticated consumer can be taken advantage of by the professional
lender. Neither is the case with litigation financing. Moreover, in litiga-
tion financing situations, there are other potential villains, the defendants
in the underlying lawsuits and their insurance companies, who may do
much greater harm to plaintiffs/borrowers who do not have access to liti-
gation funding. Defendants and their insurers may deliberately delay, 1 50
causing plaintiffs without resources to accept unreasonably low settlement
offers. Furthermore, plaintiffs may be disadvantaged by the money de-
fendants and their insurers can expend on experts and other legal sup-
port. For example, one estimate has the tobacco industry spending $600
million in attorneys' fees in 1996 alone to defend itself in lawsuits, but
there is no judicial or legislative outrage about the fairness of this expense
or the right of defense attorneys to earn that much money.15 1 Insurance
companies act as litigation funders for defendants, and they charge as
much as the market will allow. It seems only fair for plaintiffs also to have
access to financing to pursue their lawsuits. Because their funders will get
paid only if the plaintiffs win, it is highly unlikely that this kind of arrange-
ment will encourage frivolous lawsuits.
IV. A REASONABLE RATE OF RETURN
So then, the goals for litigation financing should be (1) to level the
playing field between wealthy corporate defendants and poor plaintiffs,
and (2) to allow litigation financing firms to earn enough of a return so
they will stay in business and others will enter the industry, but not so
much that they gouge plaintiffs who might be taken advantage of despite
their access to legal advice. Although financial information is not availa-
ble for most litigation financing firms because they are privately held, anal-
ogies can be made to other industries in considering a reasonable rate of
return.
A. Regulated Industries
Determining a fair rate of return for regulated industries has always
involved significant problems. 152 This is true, in part, because the U.S.
150. See, e.g., Editorial, GOP, Business Want to "Own"Justice in Ohio, DAYTON
DAILY NEWS, Mar. 31, 2003, at A10; Abraham Fuchsberg, Eliminating Delay in Tort
Cases, N.Y. L.J., June 26, 1989, at 2; Michael Horowitz & Jeffrey O'Connell, Tort
Reform "Rapid Recovery, " LEGAL TIMES, June 5, 1995, at 26.
151. See, e.g., STEPHANIE MENCIPER, BLOCKING THE COURTHOUSE DOOR-How
THE REPUBLICAN PARTY AND ITS CORPORATE ALLIES ARE TAKING AWAY YOUR RIGHT
TO SUE 79 (2006); Stanley M. Chesley, Plaintiffs'Attorney Perfects Class-Action Strategy,
Bus. INS., Oct. 30, 1997.
152. See, e.g.,JAMES C. BONBRIGHT ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC UTILITY RATES,
ch. 14 (1988); A. Lawrence Kolbe & William B. Tye, The Duquesne Opinion: How
Much "Hope" is Therefor Investors in Regulated Firms?, 8 YALE J. ON REG. 113, 140
(1991); RobertJ. Gelhaus & Gary D. Wilson, Note, An Earnings-Price Approach to Fair
Rate of Return in Regulated Industries, 20 STAN. L. REv. 287, 287 (1968).
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Supreme Court has stated that the standard for regulatory commissions is
a rate that is 'just and reasonable," but there is no standard formula for
achieving this result. 15 3 The Court noted that determining just and rea-
sonable rates requires balancing the interests of investors and
consumers. 154
Respect for investor interest means, according to the Court, a return
to the equity owner "commensurate with returns on investments in other
enterprises having corresponding risks."' 55 Moreover, the return "should
be sufficient to assure confidence in the financial integrity of the enter-
prise, so as to maintain its credit and to attract capital."15 6
Many formulas have been devised to ascertain the desired fair rate of
return, but they all require an estimation of the cost of capital, which in
turn relies on a great deal of financial information about the company. 157
It was impossible for the courts in Rancman and Fausone to know that a
return of 280% or 200% on the funds advanced in those two cases, respec-
tively, was unreasonable without any financial information about the
funders beyond the terms of the specific agreements at issue. Courts and
legislatures could arrive at a compensation method that keeps funders in
business while protecting consumers, only if funders had to disclose signif-
icant information about their enterprises. This information would have to
include whether they have borrowed funds, how much and at what rate;
how many lawsuits they have funded; how much money they have ad-
vanced; how much they have charged for each; what percent of funded
suits have yielded a return and the amount returned; how much money
was advanced on cases that were ultimately lost; how much time existed
between advancing funds and receiving proceeds; and what the firm's ex-
penses were.
In the case of the insurance industry, although there is wide variation
among state regulations, all states require that rates be neither excessive
nor inadequate, and in most states insurance companies have to justify
rate increases they want to impose by filing data on past and projected
claims, even though the insurance commissioner may have no real author-
ity over rates.1 58 The property/casualty insurance industry had a 15.6%
rate of return in the first half of 2005 and 13% in the first half of 2006,
153. See Fed'l Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 602
(1944).
154. See id. at 603.
155. See id.
156. See id.
157. See BONBRIGHT ET AL., supra note 152.
158. See Jay Angoff, The Myth of the Litigation Crisis, TRIAL, July 2006, at 30
(author is former insurance commissioner of Missouri). States' primary reason for
regulating the insurance industry was not consumer protection; it was to protect
carriers from federal anti-trust liability under the McCarren-Ferguson Act which
provided that it would not apply to the insurance business as long as the business
was regulated by state law. Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (2001)).
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peak profits over the last twenty years. 1 59 Nevertheless, state legislators are
being urged to consider liability-limiting legislation that would further in-
crease profits but not decrease rates for consumers. 160 Generally, as long
as a carrier can provide some support for a "reasonable" rate of return,
state regulators will approve it and allow the carrier to charge premiums
high enough to produce that return. 16 1
B. Deregulated Industries
Many industries have been deregulated in the last twenty years, al-
lowing the market to set their prices. In the late 1970s regulated indus-
tries comprised about 17% of U.S. economic output; today it is about
5%.162 It is interesting to see the results of deregulation in order to de-
cide whether (1) regulating litigation funding fees or (2) eliminating the
regulating effect of champerty and usury laws would actually make plain-
tiffs/borrowers better off.
In the airline industry, for example, after deregulation in 1979, com-
petition increased and average fares fell with advantages for consumers
and new entrants into the industry.1 63 One study estimated that consum-
ers benefited by about $10 billion annually (in 1977 dollars) from airline
deregulation. 16 4 Similarly, brokerage fees became dramatically lower after
the deregulation of the brokerage service industry in 1975 because broker-
age firms could then compete on prices. 165 The success of deregulation
in the airline and brokerage industries has been attributed to the frag-
mented, potentially competitive nature of those industries. 166 On the
other hand, deregulation of the telecommunications industry has been
less successful because of its structurally monopolistic nature. 167
Litigation financing is clearly fragmented in that it has many small
competitors and, by its nature, it discourages concentration. Its barriers to
entry are almost nil: (1) financial resources that may be relatively low be-
cause many firms advance under $10,000 per plaintiff/borrower, and (2) a
159. See ROBERT P. HARTWIG, INSURANCE INFORMATION INSTITUTE, COMMEN-
TARY ON FIRST HALF 2006 RESULTS (Oct. 2, 2006), available at http://server.iii.org/
yy obj data/binary/762115_1 0/0602%2oCommentary.pdf.
160. See id.; Angoff, supra note 158.
161. See Angoff, supra note 158.
162. See John E. Kwoka, Jr., Twenty-Five Years of Deregulation: Lessons for Electric
Power, 33 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 885, 885 (2002).
163. See, e.g., id. at 888-89; see also GAUTAM GOWRISANKARAN, FED'L RESERVE
BANK OF S.F., FRBSF ECONOMic LETrER: COMPETITION AND REGULATION IN THE AIR-
LINE INDUSTRY (Jan. 18, 2002), http://www.frbsf.org/publications/economics/let-
ter/2002/e2002-01.html.
164. See KENNETH W. COSTELLO & ROBERT J. GRANIERE, THE NATIONAL REGU-
LATORY RESEARCH INSTITUTE 10 (Ohio St. Univ. 1997), http://www.osti.gov/
bridge/servlets/purl/308019-ifDOIl/webviewable/308019.PDF.
165. See id. at 17.
166. See Kwoka, supra note 162, at 887, 889-91.
167. See id.
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web site. There is also no need for standardization in the industry, and
small, local firms may inspire more trust in their clients. Thus, other in-
dustry examples suggest that if competition were encouraged by eliminat-
ing fears of illegality because of champerty prohibitions and usury
ambiguities, it would result in lower fees to plaintiffs/borrowers.
C. Credit Card Issuers
For many years commentators have complained that credit card inter-
est rates are too high, 168 but there is little evidence that capping them
creates a reasonable rate of return that ultimately benefits consumers. It is
easy for lenders to evade usury restrictions, and credit card issuers have
done it by instituting annual fees, changing the method by which they
calculate interest, bundling other products like insurance with credit
cards, and selling customer lists. 169 All these maneuvers put the consumer
at a disadvantage. In fact, although consumers seem to be very loathe to
pay annual fees, they have not been very interested in credit card interest
rates.170 Moreover, when usury limitations made profitability harder to
achieve in the credit card industry, there were fewer new entrants into the
business resulting in less competition. 17 1 Furthermore, issuers were not
willing to take on more risky applicants, making low-income consumers
the most hurt by caps on rates. 172
Just as one commentator has concluded that usury limitations on
credit cards have had a negative effect particularly on low-income consum-
ers and that as long as the market is competitive, regulation will be more
harmful than helpful, 7 3 one could come to the same conclusion for litiga-
tion financing. Many users of litigation financing have also not been par-
ticularly interested in the interest rate being charged because the
financing, which was not available to them anywhere else, allowed them to
pay medical and living expenses while they maintained their lawsuits long
enough to receive appropriate resolutions.1 74
D. Hedge Funds
The government and the popular press have not been indignant
about the returns earned by hedge fund managers, presumably because
these managers work for very wealthy individuals who should be able take
care of themselves. But as pension funds and other financial organiza-
168. See, e.g., Oren Bar-Gill, Seduction by Plastic, 98 Nw. U. L. REv. 1373, 1374
(2004); Todd M. Finchler, Note, Capping Credit Card Interest Rates: An Immodest Pro-
posal, 12 ANN. REv. BANKING L. 493, 493 (1993).
169. ToddJ. Zywicki, The Economics of Credit Cards, 3 CHAP. L. Ruv. 79, 151-52
(2000).
170. See id. at 120.
171. See id. at 161.
172. See id. at 162-63.
173. See id. at 170-71.
174. See, e.g., Martin, The Litigation Financing Industry, supra note 14, at 56, 74.
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tions holding money for small individual investors become more involved
in hedge fund investment, perhaps it is relevant to note the returns for
hedge fund managers which do not seem to be viewed as unconscionable
or predatory at all. The New York Times reported the 2006 earnings for
several hedge fund managers: $1.7 billion for James Simons of Renais-
sance Technologies; $1 billion for Kenneth C. Griffith of Citadel Invest-
ment Group; $1 billion for Edward S. Lampert of ESL Investments; and at
least $240 million for the other twenty-three top hedge fund earners.175
Since their inception in the mid-1940s, hedge funds have generally
charged their investors a two percent management fee in addition to
twenty percent of investor profits each year, although some charge even
more. 176 It is only in the last year or so when average hedge fund return
has not been better than the return of a mutual fund tracking the Stan-
dard & Poor's 500-stock index that small hedge fund investors have started
to question the fees.1 77 When investors become dissatisfied with the per-
formance and fees of a hedge fund, they can take their money and put it
elsewhere. Litigation financing customers may do the same thing. There
is competition for their business, and they have professional advice. If all
funders' fees seem high, perhaps they reflect a risk too high for more
traditional lenders to advance funds to a borrower with nothing but a
pending lawsuit as collateral. Unfortunately, we cannot know for sure if
the funders do not disclose any of their financial information.
V. LITIGATION FINANCING IN AUSTRALIA AND OTHER COUNTRIES: SOME
INSTRUCTIVE EXAMPLES
Because plaintiffs in the United States do not have to pay their de-
fendants' legal expenses if the defendants win, and because plaintiffs in
the United States may be able to engage attorneys to represent them on a
contingency basis, 1 78 the issue of plaintiff financing has not been as criti-
cal in the United States as in countries where those conditions do not
pertain. Therefore, litigation financing has become much more accepted
elsewhere, and those experiences could provide some insight for U.S. ac-
ceptance and regulation of the litigation financing industry.
In the United Kingdom (UK) and Australia, for example, "access to
justice" issues have become more important as the governments seek to
reduce the expenses associated with legal aid traditionally provided to
poor plaintiffs.1 7 9 In order to keep the courthouse doors open in legal
175. SeeJenny Anderson & Julie Creswell, Make Less than $240 Million? You're
Off Top Hedge Fund List, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 24, 2007, at Al.
176. See Matthew Goldstein & Steve Rosenbush, Hedge Fund Fees: The Pressure
Builds, Bus. WK., May 14, 2007, at 40.
177. See id.
178. I.e., no fee if the plaintiff loses; a percentage of the proceeds if the plain-
tiff wins.
179. See Nikki Tait, Lawyers Test Litigation Funding Waters, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 5,
2007, at 3.
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systems where losers pay winners' legal costs and lawyers generally charge
hourly rather than contingent fees, many countries including the UK, Aus-
tralia, the Netherlands, Belgium, Germany and South Africa have become
more amenable to third parties financing lawsuits, typically on a contin-
gency basis.18 0
A. Australia
Litigation financing has become an accepted industry in Australia.' 8 1
Unlike the industry in the United States where there are many small firms
that typically advance relatively small amounts of money to personal injury
plaintiffs, 182 Australian firms generally support commercial plaintiffs with
more substantial legal claims.1 8 3 In Australia, there are five litigation
funding companies,184 one of which, IMF (Australia) Ltd., is listed on the
Australian Stock Exchange. 185
IMF went public in 2001, and has grown at a rate of a hundred per-
cent a year.186 Its portfolio of cases in the beginning of 2007 represented
total claims of about A$1 billion.1 87 IMF's average case lasts just more
than three years, and its typical fee is about thirty percent of the net pro-
ceeds of the case plus reimbursement of its costs.' 8 8 The company settles
about sixty percent of its cases, abandons about fifteen percent of those it
undertakes, and wins about two thirds of the cases that go to trial. 189 IMF
limits its investments to cases with a minimum claim of A$2 million, as it
views the litigation costs and risks of funding smaller claims commercially
180. See id.; see also Michael G. Faure et al., Funding of Personal Injury Litigation
and Claims Culture-Evidence from the Netherlands, 2 UTRECHT L. REv. 1 (2006).
181. See Tait, supra note 179, at 3.
182. See http://www.acsfcorp.com (last visited May 16, 2007); http://
www.captran.com (last visited May 16, 2007); http://nationallawsuitfunding.com
(last visited May 16, 2007). Advance Cash & Settlement Funding Corp. will ad-
vance between $1,000 and $25,000. See http://www.acsfcorp.com (last visited May
16, 2007). Capital Transaction Group, Inc. will advance between $1,000 and
$20,000. See http://www.captran.com (last visited May 16, 2007). National Lawsuit
Funding will advance between $500 and $100,000 but most of its advances are
under $10,000. See http://nationallawsuitfunding.com (last visited May 16, 2007).
183. For example, see infra note 190.
184. See Tait, supra note 179, at 3.
185. See Welcome to IMF, http://www.imf.com.au (last visited May 16, 2007).
The four others are Hillcrest Litigation Services Ltd., Litigation Lending Services
Pty Ltd., Australian Litigation Funding Pty Ltd. and Firmstone & Fell. LAw COUN-
CIL OF Ausw RA~A, LITIGATION FUNDING-REPORT TO THE STANDING COMMITrEE Or
ATT RNEYS-GENERAL 6 (Sept. 14, 2006). The five account for about 95% of all the
litigation funding in Australia. Id.
186. See Virginia Marsh, Australian Company Pioneers Approach, FIN. TIMES, Jan.
5, 2007, at 3.
187. See id. An Australian dollar is equivalent to approximately $.82 in U.S.
dollars.
188. See id.
189. See id.
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untenable. 190 It makes an exception for class actions when a large num-
ber of smaller claims may be aggregated.19 1 IMF claims that between 2001
and 2006, it has not received a single complaint about fees from its 15,000
clients. 192
Between 2002 and 2006, its return on capital of about A$30 million
has yielded A$8 million in earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT), or
about a seven percent per annum return on capital. 193 In Australia dur-
ing the same period, the major liability insurance carriers had a return on
capital of between fifteen and twenty-two percent.1 94 It is important to
note, when comparing the litigation funding experience in Australia with
that in the United States, that Australian funding firms generally finance
less risky commercial cases because they view personal injury cases as too
uncertain. 1
95
Some examples of IMF's return on specific cases are instructive for
seeing what is considered a reasonable return for a litigation financing
company in Australia. IMF invested A$500,000 in a breach of contract
case in August 2005.196 The case settled in May 2006, and IMF received
A$1.9 million.' 9 7 In a case against an accounting firm, IMF invested
A$1.45 million in August 2004.198 The case settled in October 2006, and
IMF received A$5.1 million.199 In a bankruptcy case, IMF invested
A$200,000 in June 2003.200 The plaintiffs won after the court dismissed
the defendant's appeal in November 2003, and IMF received A$1 mil-
lion.20 ' Finally, in January 2003, IMF invested A$100,000 in a case involv-
ing breach of a fiduciary duty. 20 2 The case settled in May 2003 after two
weeks of hearings, and IMF received A$500,000. 20 3
190. SeeJohn Walker (IMF), Litigation Funding for Consumers of Civil Justice Sys-
tem Services, Nov. 1, 2006, at 3, available at http://www.imf.com.au/presentations/
LitigationFundingForConsumers.pdf.
191. See id.
192. See id. at 4.
193. See LAw COUNCIL OF AUSTRALIA, supra note 185, at 6.
194. See id.
195. See id. at 12.
196. See 789 Ten Pty Ltd v. Westpac & Ors, available at http://www.imf.com.
au/cases.asp?ID=56.
197. See id.
198. See Geneva Finance v. Horwarth & Horwarth, available at http://
www.imf.com.au/cases.asp?ID= 6.
199. See id. (discussing settlement of case)
200. SeeVeremu Pty Ltd. v. Ezishop.Net Ltd., 2003 NSWCA 317 (N.S.W.) (stat-
ing facts of case), available at http://www.imf.com.au/cases.asp?ID=24.
201. See id. (stating resolution of case).
202. See Global Med. Imaging Mgmt. Ltd. v. Australian Mezzanine Inv. Ltd.,
2003 NSWSC 432 (N.S.W.) (stating facts of case).
203. See id. (stating resolution of case).
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By the end of 2006, litigation funders in Australia were investing
about A$20 million per year to support plaintiffs. 20 4 IMF estimated that
insurance companies in Australia were spending at least A$1 billion to sup-
port their insured defendants. 20 5 About half of the defendants in cases
funded by IMF had their defense managed and funded by insurance com-
panies. 20 6 The managing director of IMF in Australia sees the purpose of
litigation funding as providing the same benefits for plaintiffs that the in-
surance industry provides for defendants. 20 7 In a typical insurance con-
tract, the insurer agrees to finance any litigation arising out of the subject
of the contract.20 8 The insurer will also decide how to handle a legal
claim, will choose lawyers, and will indemnify the insured. 20 9 In Australia,
litigation funders provide the same services as insurance companies.
210
In the United States, on the other hand, litigation funders agree not
to make any decisions about the lawsuits (other than whether to finan-
cially support them in exchange for a contingent fee) and agree not to
interfere in the relationship between the plaintiffs/borrowers and their
lawyers. 2 11 In fact, in the United States, litigation funders merely advance
money to plaintiffs to use any way they wish; they do not directly fund the
litigation at all, a role that is, however, permitted for U.S. attorneys.
2 12
Furthermore, litigation funders in the United States do not take a percent-
age of the proceeds of the case. If the plaintiff wins, the funder gets a
return of the funds advanced plus one of several specific fees listed in the
agreement depending on the length of time between the advance and the
completion of the case.
Nevertheless, there has also been a longstanding fear in the United
States that litigation financing would strip plaintiffs of their power to con-
trol their litigation and would interfere with the relationship between at-
torney and client. 213 On the other side of a lawsuit it is well-accepted that
insurance companies are going to assume control of the litigation for their
defendants/insureds. The same rules that protect defendants from being
poorly represented by lawyers paid by insurance companies should be able
204. See Walker, supra note 190, at 1 (discussing litigation management by
funders).
205. See id. (same).
206. See id. at 5 (observing trends in litigation funding markets).
207. See Marsh, supra note 186 (exploring litigation funding in Australia).
208. See Walker, supra note 190, at 1 (explaining litigation management by
insurers).
209. See id. (noting role of insurers in litigation management).
210. See id. (observing similarities between insurers and litigation funders).
211. See http://www.lawcash.net/html/plaintiff-faqs.html (last viewed Oct.
25, 2007).
212. See generally MODEL RULES Or PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.8(e) (2003) (stating
lawyer may advance court costs and expenses of litigation to client).
213. See, e.g., Gregerson v. Imlay, 10 F. Cas. 1185 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1861) (No.
5795); Comment, Ethics: Client-Attorney Personal Relationship Test, 4 WM. & MARY L.
REv. 217, 222-28 (1963) (discussing perceptions of third party donating funds for
lawsuit).
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to protect plaintiffs from having litigation funders exert pressure on their
lawyers. In the United States, loyalty is an essential element of lawyers'
responsibilities to their clients. 214 The Model Rules of Professional Con-
duct prohibit lawyers from allowing third parties to interfere with their
representation of their clients. 2 15 If the rules work for defendants' law-
yers, they should also work for plaintiffs' lawyers.
The Standing Committee of Attorneys-General in Australia noted in a
discussion paper that an important consideration for Australian courts in
assessing these new litigation financing arrangements has been "access to
justice. '2 16 When defendants have challenged these agreements as being
impermissibly champertous, Australian courts during the last decade have
not stricken a single agreement, primarily for "access to justice" rea-
sons. 2 17 In a recent, highly influential opinion, the High Court of Austra-
lia noted that litigation funding and class actions may seem
"unconventional or horrible" to those practicing law before the doctrines
of champerty and maintenance became obsolete.2 18 Prohibiting litigation
funding and class actions, however, would cause many people with legiti-
mate claims to lose their legal rights to recover because they lack the re-
sources to pursue their claims. 2 19 In Campbells Cash and Cary Pty Ltd. v.
FostifPty Ltd.,220 one justice recognized the "importance of not preventing
'humble men' from receiving 'contributions to meet a powerful adver-
sary."' 221 After this decision, U.S. hedge funds began contacting Austra-
214. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. n.1 (2003) (" (L] oyalty
and independent judgment are essential elements in a lawyer's relationship to a
client"). See, e.g., Twin City Fire Ins. Co. v. Ben Arnold Sunbelt Beverage Co., 336 F.
Supp. 2d 610, 615-16 (D.S.C. 2004) (noting that lawyer hired by insurer owes un-
qualified duty of loyalty to insured); United States v. Daniels, 163 F. Supp. 2d 1288,
1290 (D. Kan. 2001) (noting counsel retained by insurer to represent insured owes
duty of loyalty to insured, not insurance carrier); Herbert A. Sullivan, Inc. v. Utica
Mut. Ins. Co., 788 N.E.2d 522, 540 (Mass. 2003) (noting lawyer hired by insurer to
represent insured owes unqualified duty of loyalty to insured and must always act
to protect interests of insured).
215. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.8(f) (2003) (describing cir-
cumstances in which lawyer can accept compensation from third party for repre-
senting client); MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCr R. 5.4(c) (2003) (stating lawyer
"shall not permit a person who recommends, employs or pays the lawyer to render
legal services for another to direct or regulate the lawyer's professional judgment
in rendering such legal services").
216. See Standing Committee of Attorneys-General, Litigation Funding in Aus-
tralia 10 (2006), http://www.justice.vic.gov.au/wps/wcm/connect/DOJ+Intemet/
Home/The+Justice+System/Community+Consultation/JUSTICE++Litigation+
Funding+Discussion+Paper+(PDF) (noting community concern that justice system
should be accessible to everyone).
217. See id. at 10-13 (discussing cost of litigation).
218. See Campbells Cash and Carry Pty Ltd. v. Fostif Pty Ltd. (2006) 80
A.L.J.R. 1441, 1467 (Austl.).
219. See id. at 1467-68 (presenting justification for litigation funding).
220. 80 A.LJ.R. 1441, 1467 (2006) (Austl.).
221. See id. at 1493 (quoting Martell v. Consett Iron Co. Ltd. (1955) Ch 363,
386).
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lian funding firms about investing in lawsuits. 2 22 The Financial Times has
described litigation financing as "a new asset class for adventurous
investors." 223
In an earlier case, the Supreme Court of New South Wales rejected
the argument of an individual plaintiff whose case had been funded by a
litigation financing firm, but who wanted the court to rescind the financ-
ing agreement on the grounds that the firm exerted too much control
over the litigation. 2 24 The court held that the agreement did not infringe
on any public policy; it further noted that it was the funding arrangement
that enabled the plaintiff to establish a meritorious claim, and therefore,
the plaintiffs argument was quite distasteful.2 25
The Law Council of Australia, a professional organization represent-
ing about 50,000 lawyers, reported to the Standing Committee of Attor-
neys-General that litigation financing firms play an important role in
making it possible for parties with legitimate legal claims to pursue those
claims when the costs of litigation would otherwise make it impossible for
them to do so.226 The Law Council advised that, like insurance premiums,
the cost of litigation funds would correspond to the risks of the funders,
and should not be controlled by regulation. 227 It also advised that litiga-
tion funders should be treated the same as insurance carriers. 228 One
commentator in Australia has suggested that the price of funding should
be transparent to the plaintiff/borrower, but otherwise should be left to
the market.22 9 He indicated, however, a current problem in Australia is
that there are so few litigation financing firms to create that market.
23 0
He concluded, nevertheless, that as long as the plaintiff/borrower receives
proper advice and is fully informed about the agreement, then a court
should not question the terms of the agreement.23 ' Depth of the market
is not, of course, a problem in the United States where there are at least
222. See Paul B. Brown, Next, a Lawsuit Futures Exchange?, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25,
2006, at C5 (noting hedge funds have contacted litigation funding companies to
invest in lawsuits).
223. Litigation Funding, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 8, 2007, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/
OebOO53e-e5bd-lldb-9fcf-000b5dfl0621.html (discussing litigation funding).
224. See Domson Pty Ltd. v. Zhu, 2005 NSWSC 1070 (N.S.W.).
225. See id.
226. See LAW COUNCIL OF AUSTRALA: LITIGATION FUNDING-REPORT TO THE
STANDING COMMITrEE OF ATrORNEYs-GENERAL 4 (Sept. 14, 2006), http://www.law
council.asn.au/sublist.html?year=2006 (discussing role of litigation financing
firms).
227. See id. (summarizing Law Council's comments).
228. See id. (same).
229. See Lee Aitken, Before the High Court-'Litigation Lending' after Fostif: An
Advance in Consumer Protection, or a Licence to 'Bottomfeeders'?, 28 SYDNEY L. REv. 171,
179 (2006) (discussing litigation funding safeguards).
230. See id. (noting current problem with market of fund providers).
231. See id. at 180 (stating conclusion).
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dozens of firms offering financing.23 2 In fact, funding opportunities are
so numerous that a business, The Funding Exchange, advertises that, with
just one application, it will electronically match a funding request with
multiple funding sources. 233
It is important to remember that in Australia, as in the United States,
not all litigation funding is for the benefit of impecunious plaintiffs. The
financing of lawsuits by third parties also serves as a risk management tool
for companies that are willing to give up a share of the proceeds of the
litigation in exchange for reducing the downside litigation risks and for
getting some of the potential returns up front.23 4 In QPSX Ltd v. Ericsson
Australia Pty Ltd (No. 3)235 the Federal Court of Australia described the
parties as "sophisticated, well resourced commercial actors operating in
domestic and international markets for the sale of complex and poten-
tially very lucrative technologies." 236 The court noted that litigation re-
lated to such technologies can be very expensive and, therefore, the
creation of arrangements that spread the costs of complex commercial
litigation and inject efficiencies into the process of enforcing legitimate
claims should be welcomed. 23 7 The court averred that such arrangements
are not contrary to the public interest and in general would not compro-
mise the integrity of the court.238
B. The United Kingdom
In the UK, the Civil Justice Council, an advisory public body responsi-
ble for overseeing the modernization of the civil justice system,23 9 con-
cluded in April 2007 that litigation funding played an important role in
facilitating access to justice and that no new regulations of the industry
were necessary.2 40 The litigation financing industry is developing in the
232. See http://www.google.com/sponsoredlinks?q=litigation+financing&hl=
en&start=O&sa=N; http://www.google.com/sponsoredlinks?q=litigation+financing
&hl=en&start=10&sa=N; http://www.google.com/sponsoredlinks?q=litigation+fi-
nancing&hl=en&start=20&sa=N; http://www.google.com/sponsoredlinks?q=litiga-
tion+financing&hl=en&start=30&sa=N. A Google search for litigation financing
firms reveals at least three dozen with sponsored links.
233. See http://www.thefundingexchange.com (last viewed May 24, 2007).
234. See Simon Theodore &Jamie Richardson, Litigation Funding in Australia,
INr'L LEGAL NEWS, July 13, 2006, available at http://www.imakenews.com/iln/e
article000617585.cfm?x=bll,0,w (discussing litigation funding in Australia).
235. (No. 3) (2005) FCA 933.
236. Id. at 18 (noting sophistication of litigants).
237. See id. (identifying positive aspects of litigation financing arrangements).
238. See id. (upholding litigation funding arrangements).
239. See Civil Justice Council-About Us, http://www.civiljusticecouncil.gov.
uk/about/about.htm (describing Civil Justice Council).
240. See generally Mayer, Brown, Rowe & Maw LLP, Litigation & Dispute Resolu-
tion Legal Update 5, May 2007, http://www.mayerbrownrowe.com/london (noting
conclusions of Civil Justice Council).
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UK because lawyers there cannot charge on a contingency basis. 241 The
industry is being funded by hedge funds, insurers and private investors
who finance lawsuits in exchange for a share of the proceeds, if there are
any. 242
One litigation funding firm in the UK, IM Litigation Funding ("IM"),
was started by a group of lawyers in 2002.243 IM generally requires a sev-
enty percent chance of success for a case it decides to fund.2 4 4 Its invest-
ments start at £50,000,245 generally using its own funds in combination
with those of hedge funds.24 6 IM says it has won more than three-quarters
of the cases it has funded. 247 When IM wins, it gets between twenty-five
and fifty percent of the proceeds of the case in addition to reimbursement
of expenses. 248 In its most successful case, it had a return of 1,300% in ten
months. 249
A business publication in the UK reported that the litigation financ-
ing market there is still in its infancy, unlike the very active market in
Australia, but rumors of hedge fund interest suggest there will be an in-
crease in lawsuits in the near future.2 50 UK lawyers are anticipating more
lawsuits against auditors by investors in bankrupt companies who, in the
past, might have had strong cases but no resources to fight them; however,
they are not anticipating an increase in frivolous claims because funders
would have to pay for the winners' legal costs which could be a severe
penalty.2
5 1
C. South Afica
Three years ago, the Supreme Court of Appeal in South Africa held
that a litigation financing agreement was not void or contrary to public
policy and that such an agreement between the plaintiff and a third party
241. See Mary Jacoby, UK. Auditions Litigation: Regulators Urge U.S.-Style Suits
Against Cartels, WALL ST. J., Jan. 16, 2007, at A12 (exploring lawsuit financing in
United Kingdom); see also Andrew Hill, Money for Smart Suits, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 5,
2007, at 18 (noting that hedge funds are starting to fund litigation in UK).
242. SeeJacoby, supra note 241, at A12.
243. See LITIGATION FUNDING, supra note 226 (discussing IM Litigation
Funding).
244. See id. (explaining how IM Litigation Funding decides which cases to
invest in).
245. See Exchange Rates, http://www.x-rates.com/ (last visited Oct. 13, 2007).
A British pound is equivalent to approximately $2.03 in U.S. dollars. See id.
246. See LITIGATION FUNDING, supra note 226 (illustrating company's invest-
ment in lawsuits).
247. See id. (discussing investments of IM Litigation Funding).
248. See id. (same).
249. See id. (same).
250. See Philip Smith, Best Practice: Negligence Claims Could Reach New Heights
with Litigation Funding Trend, IT WEEK, Feb. 15, 2007, available at http://
www.itweek.co.uk/articles/print/2183554 (discussing litigation funding trend in
United Kingdom).
251. See id. (same).
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could not be used by the defendant as a defense. 25 2 The Court noted
South Africa's history of refusing to enforce champertous agreements,
253
but it acknowledged one clear exception: an agreement is enforceable if it
is between a person, who in good faith, gives financial aid to a poor poten-
tial plaintiff in exchange for an interest in the lawsuit.254 According to the
Court, such an agreement is enforceable because it supports justice and
promotes the constitutionally protected freedom of contract.
25 5
VI. CONCLUSIONS FOR REGULATION
The foregoing examples of responses to the developing litigation fi-
nancing industries in other countries suggest that where access to the
courts has been more limited than in the United States, because of loser-
pays-costs rules and limitations on attorneys' fees, litigation financing is
viewed more favorably. It is a way to address an obvious problem without
requiring the government to provide more aid for legal expenses. Al-
though the United States has always emphasized an open door policy to
the courts as compared to other countries, it is unrealistic to think that, as
a practical matter, court doors are sufficiently open to poor plaintiffs with
meritorious claims who are opposed by well-financed defendants and their
insurance companies. Furthermore, there is no public policy reason to
deny businesses the opportunity to share litigation's risks and cash outlay
with interested investors in exchange for some of the proceeds. With
some new and specific regulation, and the elimination of current potential
impediments, it should be possible to preserve the advantages of litigation
financing while eliminating abuses. The experiences in other countries
support these conclusions.
First, state legislatures should eliminate the champerty doctrine. A
few state courts have already done that, but some have instead affirmed
the practice. 25 6 In either case, to encourage the industry and create more
competition so that market forces can act to lower fees, legislatures should
eliminate the fear among funders that once a case is resolved their
252. See Price Waterhouse Coopers, Inc. v. Nat'l Potato Co-op. Ltd. 2004 (6) SA 66
(SCA) at 79-80 (S. Afr.) (holding that third party agreements advancing costs of
legal fees are not contrary to public policy).
253. See id. 26 (noting that such agreements were not upheld in past).
254. See id. 27 (describing exception to general prohibition).
255. See id. 44 (holding that third party litigation financing arrangements
are consistent with constitutional values).
256. See, e.g., Rancman v. Interim Settlement Funding Corp., 789 N.E.2d 217,
218 (Ohio 2003) (holding that Ohio prohibits champerty and rescinding agree-
ment on that ground); Osprey, Inc. v. Cabana Ltd. P'ship, 532 S.E.2d 269, 277
(S.C. 2000) (holding that champerty cannot be used as defense because there are
other devices for eliminating potential evils associated with litigation financing);
Saladini v. Righellis, 687 N.E.2d 1224, 1224 (Mass. 1997) (holding that champerty
doctrine is no longer law in Massachusetts because there are other devices for
eliminating potential evils associated with litigation financing); Johnson v. Wright,
682 N.W.2d 671, 680 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004) (holding that champerty doctrine is in
effect in Minnesota).
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payback will be a lawsuit asking for a rescission of their agreement. Inves-
tors are not going to fund frivolous lawsuits. Businesses looking for inves-
tors are disadvantaged by such a paternalistic doctrine that may limit
investor interest. In the event of investor overreaching, courts have other
tools to police abuses.
Second, state legislatures should define litigation financing as invest-
ments, not loans, to eliminate the threat of plaintiffs/borrowers accepting
funds and then reneging, arguing usury, on their agreements to pay the
stipulated fees out of the proceeds of their lawsuits. They have lawyers to
represent their interests in entering into those agreements. Moreover, it
should not be a court's task to decide how much risk a funder has under-
taken and how small a risk must be to transform an investment into a loan.
In addition, it is often the case that price caps hurt just the people they are
supposed to protect.
Third, to assure the proper disclosure, transparency and advice to
borrowers that will prevent abuses in the industry, state legislatures should
adopt a licensing regime for litigation funders that would include data
collection about the industry. The licensing system currently being cre-
ated by the NASD for the CSBS for the mortgage industry could serve as a
model. 257 NASD already operates two similar systems for state regulators,
one for the securities industry and one for the financial planning and in-
vestment advisor industry.2 58 A licensing system would provide plaintiffs/
borrowers with information about the funders and discourage predatory
funders. 2 59
Fourth, litigation funders should have to be licensed, and licensees
should be required to comply with the rules set out by the New York Attor-
ney General's Office in an agreement with nine litigation financing firms
operating in New York.2 60 These rules incorporated the following re-
quirements: all funding contracts should have to use plain, ordinary lan-
guage with topics clearly divided and captioned. 261 The contracts should
clearly contain: (1) the total amount advanced; (2) all fees individually
itemized; (3) the total fee as an annualized rate of return; (4) the total
257. See Subprime and Predatory Lending: New Regulatory Guidance, Current Market
Conditions, and Effects on Regulated Financial Institutions: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Fin. Inst. and Consumer Credit of the H. Comm. on Fin. Serv., I10th Cong. 9 (2007)
(statement of Steven L. Antonakes, Mass. Comm'r of Banks, Conference of State
Bank Supervisors), available at http://www.house.gov/apps/list/hearing/financial
svcs-dem/htantonakes06l3O7.pdf (examining mortgage lending system).
258. See id. (same).
259. See id. (same).
260. See Assurance of Discontinuance Pursuant to Executive Law § 63(15), Att'y
Gen. of N.Y., Bur. of Consumer Frauds & Prot., In re Plaintiff Support Services,
Inc., Feb. 17, 2005), available at http://www.americanlegalfin.com/alfasite2/docu-
ments/ALFAAgreementWithAttorneyGeneral.pdf (listing requirements of con-
sumer contracts).
261. See id. at 4 (same); see also N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAw § 5-702 (2007) (requir-
ing use of plain language in consumer transactions).
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amount to be repaid, with amounts listed in six-month intervals, including
all fees and minimums, if any; (5) a right to cancel within five days of
receipt of the advance by returning the advance; and (6) a written certifi-
cation by the plaintiff/borrower's attorney that the terms of the contract
were explained to the plaintiff/borrower. 26 2
The outlined regulation would help plaintiff/borrowers choose the
best litigation financing arrangement available because all relevant infor-
mation would be disclosed and explained. It would also enable litigation
financing firms to know that their agreements would be enforced by
courts. Eliminating uncertainty and discouraging an "outlaw" reputation
would increase competition in the industry, which should help lessen costs
for plaintiffs/borrowers.
Government should not be so paternalistically protective of people
who do not have access to traditional forms of credit that it keeps those
people from owning homes, having washers and dryers or pursuing meri-
torious lawsuits. More widely available credit creates important opportuni-
ties for those with a poor credit history or without any credit history at all.
Thus, legislatures and courts must recognize that subprime credit is going
to be more expensive, because the risks are greater for the lender, and not
seek, because of sympathy for subprime borrowers, to compare subprime
rates with those of traditional lenders. Doing so will discourage litigation
funders, 263 decreasing competition and opportunities instead of ex-
panding them, and forcing plaintiffs with no resources to accept unfairly
low settlement offers because they cannot afford to wait for a better offer
or to go to trial.
262. See Assurance of Discontinuance Pursuant to Executive Law § 63(15), supra
note 260, at 4-5 (listing requirements of contracts).
263. See, e.g., Martin, supra note 2, at 96, 96 n.83 (citing CEO of New Jersey
litigation financing firm who stopped advancing funds in Ohio after Rancman
decision).
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